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Introduction: remembering TPS1
I am grateful to the organisers for inviting me to this confer-
ence, as it also gives me the opportunity to visit the European 
University Institute (EUI) one more time. Every return to the 
hills of Fiesole is pleasant and brings back memories. This time 
the memory is that of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa: a long-time 
“friend of the EUI”, as your website reads. Tommaso’s associ-
ation with EUI was a long one. In 1982 he met here Altiero 
Spinelli2, whose professional and personal influence would 
become central to his life. After that, he came back regularly to 
lecture and give speeches; I am honoured to say that I joined 
him a few times. Following his untimely death in 2010, his 
personal archives were donated to the EUI and will be, in due 
course, available to scholars. Recently, the Institute has created 
a Chair named after him, which will help preserve his memory 
and continue his research.
15 years ago (in March 2000) Tommaso wrote an article that, 
though not being among his most cited ones, I always found 
remarkable. The title is “An institutional glossary of the 
Eurosystem”.3 The word “glossary” is an understatement, and 
refers to the dictionary-like form of the article. The ambition of 
the piece is no less than to review, for the newly created ECB, 
some of the foundations of central banking developed over 30 
or more years of research and debates: things like central bank 
goals, independence, transparency, accountability, and so on. 
The semantic expedient is used to convey two implicit mes-
sages: first, that those notions are not immutable but should 
be interpreted and applied according to the times and cir-
cumstances; second, that the euro and the ECB are such novel 
endeavours that in order to understand them one must, first 
and foremost, redefine the language.
This article came to my mind while we were preparing for the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and during its first year 
of activity. The crisis called into question many established 
wisdoms regarding financial policies: monetary policy strat-
egies and operations, lending of last resort, banking regula-
tion and supervision, crisis management, contagion control, 
state support to banking, and so on. The lessons are relevant 
especially for the euro area, which is, in fact, where the main 
institutional changes are taking place. As the dust settles, one 
feels the need for a systematic rethinking and redefinition of 
many of those common wisdoms that looked immutable to 
many of us until 2006. In the field of banking supervision, the 
1. I am grateful to Cécile Meys for her excellent support and to Jakob 
Orthacker for useful comments.
2. The episode is recorded in Spinelli’s diaries, Vol. III, p. 813. I am grateful 
to Antonio Padoa-Schioppa for pointing this out to me.
3. T. Padoa-Schioppa, “An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem”, pre-
pared for the conference on “The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the 
Views of the EP and the ECB”, 8 March 2000 (  http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/key/date/2000/html/sp000308_1.en.html ).
SSM, newly created precisely to respond to some of those chal-
lenges, is ideally placed to put any new thinking into practice.
I do not plan to carry out a similar task in my intervention 
today. I lack the time, let alone the vision and the insight, to 
do for supervision what Tommaso did for monetary policy 15 
years ago. I just want to offer some reflections triggered by our 
experience in starting the SSM, also in the light of the crisis 
and my earlier experiences in the ECB monetary policy func-
tion. The similarities and differences between the two policy 
areas are instructive. I will organise my arguments around a 
few main themes, starting with the scope of banking supervi-
sion, its goals or mission, then moving on to its independence, 
transparency and accountability, and concluding with the rela-
tion with its “host”, the central bank.
Banking supervision: drawing the 
boundaries
Let’s indulge, for once, in Tommaso’s habit of starting a dis-
cussion on a topic by examining first the literal meaning of 
its name. The Webster online dictionary, under “supervision”, 
refers to “watching and directing what someone does or how 
something is done”. The Latin origin (super and visio) literally 
means “to view from above”. The English terms “surveillance” 
and “oversight” are etymologically equivalent, though some-
times they acquire different meanings in economic policy 
practice. The German Aufsicht and the French supervision 
convey the same idea, while in the Italian vigilanza the ety-
mology is lost.
What does “seeing from above” mean? I think it would be 
presumptuous to assume that those who exercise supervision 
are always “superior” to those being supervised, profession-
ally, morally or in other senses. It doesn’t hurt if they are, but 
we cannot count on this being always the case. The interpreta-
tion I favour is that, in order to watch and direct, the super-
visor has to be in a position to observe the broader context in 
which the actions take place. It has recently become clear that 
this superior perspective is essential: it is impossible to gain a 
proper understanding of the “safety and soundness” of a bank, 
in any relevant case, if that picture does not include the links 
between that bank, other banks and the broader economic 
and financial environment. The banking system is nested in 
the broader global financial and economic system in a com-
plex interconnected structure, with different layers.4 Recently, 
for example, shadow banking is increasingly in focus, as are 
the potential risks from the insurance and pension funds sec-
tors. The interconnection with banks should not be underes-
timated. Supervision focused only on the books and activities 
4. A. Haldane: On microscopes and telescopes, Speech given at the Lorentz 
centre workshop on socio-economic complexity, Leiden 27 March 2015.
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of individual banks is insufficient and potentially misleading. I 
will say something later on how the SSM tries to combine the 
micro- and macro-financial perspectives.
Observing supervisors at work, I have noticed a recurring 
tension in the way the limits between supervision and regula-
tion are defined. In English, the term “banking regulation” 
encompasses both supervisory and regulatory functions, but 
in continental Europe we consider them distinct. Regulators 
(including lawmakers) are supposed to write the rules, while 
supervisors merely ensure they are observed. I have used this 
distinction myself at times, because it is easy to explain and to 
understand. But it is to some extent illusory, and there is a risk 
it may at times become a way to elude responsibilities. The 
line between the two functions has weakened further recently. 
Let’s consider the European example. In 2011, three “super-
visory agencies” were created; in fact, they are not supervi-
sors – in the strict sense of monitoring compliance – but EU 
secondary regulators, tasked with ensuring that European 
laws are transposed into national law and applied consist-
ently across all countries in the Union. In the area of banking, 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) does this by issuing 
implementation rules and technical standards that Member 
States (notably their supervisors and banks) are supposed to 
apply. Conversely, the EU supervisory authorities – meaning 
the SSM for 19 Member States and the respective national 
authorities for the remaining 9 – not only check compliance, 
but actively contribute to shaping the rules within the EBA’s 
decision-making process.
More importantly, national and European banking laws and 
secondary regulations typically set minimum standards (for 
example, for capital and liquidity ratios), not specific levels 
that banks have to maintain. Nothing prevents banks from 
upholding standards above those minima, and supervisors 
in fact typically require sizeable additional margins as part of 
their so-called Pillar 2 evaluation and intervention process. 
The Pillar 2 process consists in examining all sources of risks 
to banks, in addition to those inherent in the determination 
of minimum solvency criteria; this includes other balance 
sheet features, like liquidity and maturity transformation, plus 
internal organisation, governance, controls, the sustainability 
of the bank’s business model in different economic scenarios, 
and so on. The Pillar 2 process includes also macro-pruden-
tial elements, according to European legislation (CDRIV and 
CRR), though it rarely plays a central part. Supervisors typi-
cally incorporate all these elements in a framework (we can 
call it the “supervisory model”) to ensure consistency. The 
framework is to some extent quantified, by means of scoring 
methods, and allows margins of subjective judgement.5 The 
5. More in detail, in the ECB the risk assessment system (RAS) supports su-
pervisors’ day-to-day supervisory work. It is used for evaluating banks’ 
risk levels and controls, their business model, their internal governance, 
end result is the determination of prudential add-ons to the 
minimum capital requirements, as well as the identification of 
other actions that banks are asked to undertake, depending on 
individual conditions.
There is a general tendency for Pillar 2 processes to become 
more articulated, systematic and codified, hence more trans-
parent and convergent towards international best practices. 
The ECB has developed a methodology for its own evaluation 
process, starting from the experience of its constituent national 
authorities, that will be applied this year for the first time to the 
banks it supervises directly.
An important warning should be made here. While supervi-
sion becomes more rich and systematic, acquiring some regu-
latory characters, efficiency and simplicity constraints become 
more pressing. Supervision should never become a further 
regulatory overlay. The burden of compliance for the industry 
is already high and should be kept under control. This is espe-
cially important in the SSM area, where new authorities have 
been created.
Mission
Let’s move one step further. If we regard supervisors/regulators 
as agents delegated by society to accomplish a mission, more 
questions arise. What is the goal of banking supervision and 
regulation, and who should set that goal?
As I am speaking in a university, let me say first that I am sur-
prised to see so little research devoted to the goals of banking 
regulation. The comparable literature on monetary policy is 
endless; discussions on how to set, measure, pursue and jus-
tify the goals of monetary policy virtually never stop, acquiring 
new life at each turn of the economy – the latest crisis being 
no exception. In other policy domains, such as public budgets, 
taxation or labour markets, debates on the nature of the policy 
objectives are less intense, but still more active – it seems to me 
– than what we see happening in the field of prudential regula-
tion and supervision.
I don’t think this depends on the questions to be asked being 
trivial, or the answers unimportant. It probably has to do with 
certain complexities that discourage both the academic and the 
practitioner in tackling the subject head-on, and especially in 
entering into exchanges with one another. Between the banking 
supervisor and the theorist in the same field there is more dis-
tance and less understanding than between their homologues 
their capital adequacy and their liquidity adequacy on an ongoing basis. 
The outcome of the RAS is combined in the overall Supervisory review 
and evaluation process (SREP), which aims at ensuring that institutions 
have adequate arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms, as 
well as capital and liquidity to ensure a sound management and coverage 
of their risks.
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on the monetary policy side. The complexities have to do, in 
part, with the confidentiality of the subject and the vested inter-
ests involved. Supervisors deal with companies that compete 
on the market and are therefore reluctant to release informa-
tion. As a result, the supervisory process takes place largely in 
the shadows, and this makes both scrutiny and independent 
analysis more difficult. Another factor is that the policy process 
itself is difficult to define, involving a multiplicity of instru-
ments used to attain a continuum of generically defined objec-
tives. We are very far from the simple one-instrument, one-
target, one-transmission mechanism environment that most 
monetary policy scholars are familiar with.
Those complexities and that distance have costs. To begin 
with, it is more difficult for supervisors to communicate with 
public opinion or other non-specialists. The absence of explicit 
analytical frameworks and well-articulated policy objectives 
makes it more difficult to explain, in non-technical terms, what 
needs to be done and when, and why occasional policy fail-
ures occur. The activity of supervisors, not generally visible 
to outsiders, falls suddenly under the spotlight when banking 
crises occur; when that happens, the supervisor is usually 
found guilty without appeal. This lack of visibility may explain, 
incidentally, a somewhat lower perceived attractiveness of the 
supervisory profession relative, for example, to core central 
banking functions. The latter are – wrongly, I think – consid-
ered more “glamorous” because they appear to be more scien-
tific and make the newspaper headlines more often. I want to 
note here, in passing, that this perception did not prevent the 
ECB, last year, from conducting a very successful recruitment 
for its supervisory structures, attracting high talents both from 
the supervisory community and from the market.
A consequence of this communication gap is a widely held 
public misperception of what supervision is supposed to 
achieve. Most non-specialists probably think banking policies 
should prevent bank failures in all circumstances. This expecta-
tion is unfounded, of course. Banks are subject to market dis-
cipline like other private firms. Their specific safety arrange-
ments are meant to protect not their shareholders, but other 
stakeholders, including creditors and users of banking services 
that are regarded as public goods (like payments), and ulti-
mately the general taxpayer, who acts as a backstop.
Is this extra degree of complexity and opacity an inherent 
feature of banking supervision, or is it the fruit of inherited 
working practices that can and should be changed? Views 
differ. I would agree with those who think that certain risks 
faced by banking supervisors, and them alone, require to be 
treated with particular caution in public communication. At 
the same time, I am also convinced that much more work can 
and should be done to make supervisory practices more trans-
parent and better understood by all.
Let me return to the initial question now, concerning the goals 
of supervision. The Core Principles of the Basel Committee 
state that the primary objective for banking supervision is to 
promote the “safety and soundness” of banks.6 However, the 
meaning of “safety and soundness” needs to be clarified. For 
sure, it does not mean riskless. Banks are risky by definition; 
they cannot conduct their business otherwise.7 I think those 
terms mean, generally speaking, that the risks borne by the 
taxpayer and by the creditors of the bank are appropriately 
contained and transparently disclosed. The exact extent and 
distribution of those risks, however, needs to be determined 
more precisely.8
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein9 have proposed a definition of the 
goals of micro- vs. macro-prudential supervision, assuming, 
in accordance with neoclassical logic, that public policy inter-
venes only to correct market failures. In their view, micro-pru-
dential policy should correct the distortion towards risk taking 
created by the safety net. Conversely, macro-prudential policy 
is meant to correct for other market failures, also giving rise to 
undue risk taking, generated by “systemic externalities”.
I find this argument useful but incomplete. If bank services 
provide positive externalities to society, then not all taxpayer 
risk should be removed. Over-regulation is also sub-optimal. 
At the same time, the correct balance between taxpayer risk 
and the involvement of other stakeholders (shareholders, 
creditors) depends on collective preferences. We are crossing 
the line between technical competence and politics. Political 
reasons help explain, for example, why after the recent crisis 
regulation has increasingly tended to protect the taxpayer at 
the expense of bank creditors. In Europe, the bail-in provisions 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which are par-
ticularly severe, are an illustration.
I draw three conclusions from this discussion.
First, regulation and supervision should aim at balancing the 
risks and benefits of banking, taking into account all externali-
ties involved. The correct solution is not one in which all tax-
payer risk is removed.
6. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, September 2012. Principle 1 states, inter alia, “The 
primary objective of banking supervision is to promote the safety and 
soundness of banks and the banking system. If the banking supervisor 
is assigned broader responsibilities, these are subordinate to the primary 
objective and do not conflict with it”.
7. D. Diamond and R. Rajan, December 1999, “Liquidity Risk, Liquidity 
Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking”, NBER Working 
Paper Series No 7430.
8. The SSM Regulation (article 1) specifies that the stability of the financial 
system is also an objective of the SSM (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/201311/20131104ATT73792/20131104ATT73
792EN.pdf).
9. See Hanson S. G., Kashyap A. K and Stein J. C., (2011), “A Macropru-
dential Approach to Financial Regulation”, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 25(1), pp. 3-28.
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Second, society should be put in a position to express more 
explicitly its preference as to where that balance is located; at 
present this form of collective guidance is lacking almost eve-
rywhere. This requires appropriate public communication on 
the nature of banking, its risks and implications; difficult issues 
on which specialists are also divided.
Third, more research is needed. We need proxies for bank 
risk and stability, providing a yardstick for setting supervisory 
goals and measuring performance. More work is needed also 
on supervisory instruments, clarifying how they interact with 
each other and how they affect stability (the “transmission 
mechanism”). Finally, evidence is needed on the interconnec-
tions and feedbacks between banks and the economy. Advances 
have been made, especially by network and contagion analyses; 
important micro-data sets on interbank exposures are being 
developed. Supervisory practice should hopefully be able to 
make increasing use of those data.
Independence
In thinking about supervisory independence, drawing a par-
allel with central banking can be helpful.
It is generally accepted that, in order to be successful, monetary 
policy needs to be free from short-term political interference 
and delegated to a technically equipped agency, the central 
bank, formally bound to a clearly defined goal. To balance that 
independence, appropriate reporting obligations must exist 
(“accountability”), requiring the central bank to provide infor-
mation on its actions (“transparency”). Delegation of com-
plex policy tasks where time inconsistency problems arise has 
proved to be beneficial not only in monetary policy but also in 
other policy areas.
Now the question arises: does the same framework apply to 
banking supervision? Or is there something inherently dif-
ferent there that warrants specific arrangements? This question 
was not explored in detail until the late 1990s, when several 
countries (the United Kingdom being the most prominent 
example) decided to separate banking supervision from the 
central bank and entrust it to a separate agency. This is a bit 
surprising to me, because while differences exist between the 
two policy functions – as I shall argue – they are still relevant 
regardless of whether they are performed by the same institu-
tion or not.
I think that the criteria suggesting delegation to an inde-
pendent agency suit banking supervision no less than mon-
etary policy. First of all, banking supervision is highly technical 
and complex, requiring a mix of financial, accounting and legal 
expertise. Moreover, the potential conflict between short-term 
and long-term objectives (the time inconsistency problem) is 
likely to be relevant as well; for example, supervisory forbear-
ance may help to protect confidence in individual institutions 
in the short run, if the supervisor enjoys a high degree of cred-
ibility, but is likely to be detrimental to such credibility – and to 
financial stability – over a longer horizon. In addition, banking 
supervision typically involves important vested interests, a fur-
ther reason for separating policy from direct political control.
This notion has been recognised in recent years as a key com-
ponent of bank supervisory practice. The Core Principles of 
the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision specifically mention 
the need for operational independence of supervisors without 
interference by government or industry.10 The supervisor 
should have full discretion to decide when and if it needs to 
take action.
A high degree of transparency is especially suited to a new 
institution like the SSM, which has no track record. In par-
ticular, the EU Regulation establishing the SSM stipulates that 
the ECB should be bound in its decision-making process by 
Union rules and general principles on due process and trans-
parency. In this context, the ECB is accountable towards the 
European Parliament and the Council. This includes regular 
reporting, and responding to questions by the European Par-
liament and the Eurogroup.11
Transparency and accountability
While the case for independence is relatively straightforward, 
specific circumstances make transparency and accountability 
in supervision especially delicate, requiring particular safe-
guards.
First, supervision is special in that it involves handling two 
types of information, one concerning the authority itself and 
its behaviour (proceedings, deliberations, internal thinking, 
strategy and methodologies, etc.), and the other concerning 
the supervised entities.
Second, supervisors typically obtain, in the exercise of their 
function, sensitive information about the situation of indi-
vidual banks. Proprietary information generated within the 
bank may, if publicly known, affect its competitive position. 
The supervisor does not have the legal right to disclose such 
information; the obligation may fall on the banks, themselves, 
in certain cases. Banks typically trust that the supervisor will 
10. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision, September 2012 (  http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs230.pdf).
11. See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 confer-
ring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201311/20131104ATT737
92/20131104ATT73792EN.pdf).
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treat information confidentially, and this facilitates the flow of 
information between them. A similar situation is not typically 
seen in monetary policy.
Third, the supervisory process generates information on the 
soundness of individual banks – their solvency, liquidity, prof-
itability, quality of internal governance, viability of business 
models, etc. Early disclosure, especially when the picture is 
not yet complete and any necessary countermeasures have still 
to be taken or planned, can be risky and counterproductive, 
endangering financial stability. This does not exclude, however, 
the publication of supervisory statistical data, along the lines of 
what is done in the United States, for example.
The supervisor in the central bank: 
cohabitation issues
I have to mention here an instance in which I disagreed with 
Tommaso. In an article written for an ECB conference, he 
argued that central banking and financial stability are linked 
because financial stability is in the “genetic code” of central 
banks. He referred to the historical role of central banks, in 
many countries, as guardian of stability.12 At the time (2002), 
macro-prudential policies were not established yet, hence what 
he essentially meant was that central banks should be involved 
in banking supervision.
I objected, arguing that institutions evolve, just like biological 
species do (penguins was the example I used, that nowadays 
use their former wings as flippers); the habits of our ancestors 
should not impede that evolution when conditions change. My 
argument echoed the prevailing thinking of the time, with its 
preference for narrowly defined central banks disjoint from 
supervision.13
12. T. Padoa-Schioppa, “Central banks and financial stability: exploring 
a land in between”, in V. Gaspar, P. Hartmann and O. Sleijpen (eds.), 
The transformation of the European financial system. Second ECB Cen-
tral banking conference, Frankfurt am Main, European Central Bank, 
2003, pp. 269-310. He developed the argument as follows: “It was – and, 
I would be inclined to say, still is – an integral part or an inseparable 
component of the central bank as a bank, of its monopoly on ultimate 
liquidity, of its role as the bankers’ bank, and of commercial banks as 
creators of money themselves”.
13. There is a very large literature on the pros and cons of centralising mon-
etary policy and supervision in the same institution. Arguments favour-
ing normally refer to the advantages that an insider knowledge of the 
banking sector entail for the conduct of monetary policy, especially 
when this takes the form of lending-of-last-resort in crisis times. There 
are also synergies between supervisors and other core central banking 
functions, such as the oversight of payment systems. Conversely, cen-
tralisation may give rise to conflicts of interest, as the fragility of the 
banking system may lead the central bank to pursue a more accom-
modating monetary policy stance than warranted for the pursuance 
of price stability. See, for example, C. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker 
(1995), “Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervi-
sion be Separated?”, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 40, pages 539-
560.
I felt rather happy about my objection at the time, but in fact 
events proved him right shortly after. The crisis produced a 
unification – or re-unification – of central banking and super-
visory functions almost everywhere. The most documented 
case is probably that of the Bank of England, but the pattern 
is more general. Central banks that host supervisory functions 
normally are organised so as to maintain an orderly distinction 
between the two activities, in the form, for example, of separate 
decision making bodies, organograms, and a degree of atten-
tion and control over the extent and the modality in which 
information is exchanged.
The ECB is a case in point. The decision to locate the new single 
supervisor in the ECB was almost immediate. It was dictated by 
legal considerations but also by the will to strengthen the new 
authority from the outset with the experience and the estab-
lished reputation of the ECB. At the same time, the legislators 
– notably the European Parliament – insisted that clear separa-
tion lines should be included in the charter.
The SSM Regulation specifically mentions that the supervisory 
tasks should be separated from the monetary policy function. 
Provisions are included in the SSM Regulation to bring this 
about. A separate Supervisory Board has been established, in 
which senior representatives from all participating Member 
States, four ECB representatives, and a Chair and Vice-Chair 
participate. This Board is responsible for planning and exe-
cuting the supervisory tasks and for drafting all supervisory 
decisions. The Governing Council of the ECB formally adopts 
the decisions via a non-objection procedure. In the case that 
the Governing Council does object to a draft decision prepared 
by the Supervisory Board, an established mediation panel is 
activated to resolve the differences.
The operation of the Governing Council is completely differ-
entiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions. Such 
differences include strictly separated meetings and agendas. 
Moreover, the supervisory units are organisationally distinct 
from and subject to separate reporting lines. The ECB has set 
up a formal “separation framework”, in the form of internal 
arrangements to distinguish the two functions, in particular 
with respect to professional secrecy and the exchange of 
information,14 while at the same time ensuring that the organi-
sational and information synergies are exploited.
These arrangements are working. The clear statutory mandates 
of the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council make a 
blurring of responsibilities unlikely. The two bodies interact 
regularly, with the respective roles clearly delineated. More-
over, regular joint meetings are convened to discuss financial 
14. See the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 
on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy and 
supervision functions of the European Central Bank (https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_ecb_2014_39_f_sign.pdf).
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stability and macro-prudential issues, where central banking 
and supervisory interests intersect.15
Conclusion
This speech has already been long enough; moreover, its intent 
was to present elements for reflection, not firm policy state-
ments. Hence no specific conclusions are needed.
To the prevailing academic audience, I would like to remind 
that the banking and financial regulatory/supervisory universe 
is in a state of rapid evolution everywhere, with consequences 
that are important for the society as a whole. There are many 
interesting and important issues that call for more research. Do 
not misinterpret the distance that exists, at present, between 
supervisors and academics as a sign that your work is uninter-
esting or unimportant. It is not. And that distance needs to be 
narrowed.
Thank you for your attention.
15. At the ECB, the ultimate decision-maker regarding the activation of 
macro-prudential policies is the Governing Council, acting on a draft 
decision submitted by the Supervisory Board. In practice, the Governing 
Council interacts closely with the Supervisory Board, usually to strict 
deadlines. An effort is being made to combine micro-prudential and 
systemic considerations, against the background of the broader macro-
financial situation. Every quarter, the Governing Council and the Super-
visory Board convene in joint sessions to examine the macro-prudential 
situation. The Governing Council can also request the Supervisory 
Board to submit a proposal or to undertake studies concerning specific 
sources of vulnerabilities. At the ECB a Macro-Prudential Coordination 
Group has been established, comprising Board members and staff with 
the relevant expertise.
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